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The Portrait of Socrates in Plato’s Symposium (William J. Prior)
Introduction
Plato’s dialogues offer us numerous portraits of Socrates. Some of these are
dramatic depictions that show us Socrates in conversation with various interlocutors.
Others are descriptions of Socrates, sometimes presented by others, sometimes by
Socrates himself. One of these descriptive portraits occurs in Plato’s Symposium. The
portrait is complex, being made up of several contributions from several different
characters. The relation among these various portraits is complicated. I believe that, taken
together, they constitute a coherent description, when certain perspectival differences and
other internal features of the individual portraits are taken into account. Thus, I shall
speak in this paper of “the portrait” of Socrates in the Symposium, rather than of multiple
portraits. I cannot prove, beyond what I say here, that the various portraits amount to a
coherent whole. Nor can I establish that the portrait is coherent in every detail. Still, I
think it is consistent in its main elements.
I am interested in this portrait for two reasons. First, I find it interesting in its own
right. It is a central element in one of the most important Platonic dialogues, and on those
grounds alone worthy of serious study. Second, I think it has a serious claim to be an
accurate representation of the historical Socrates. I do not believe that this claim can be
ultimately established beyond doubt; Plato gives us several rival portraits of Socrates in
the dialogues, not all of which are consistent with each other, and we do not have the
basis for choice among them.1 Still, the portrait of Socrates in the Symposium makes as
strong a claim as any Platonic portrait to be historical.

1

The chief incompatibility, in my view, is between the portrait of Socrates as barren, as a philosopher who
only questions others and who does not even express opinions of his own about philosophical questions, let
alone issue claims to knowledge, and the Socrates who has such opinions and even, on occasion, makes
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I want to make it clear at the outset that I accept the fact that the portrait of
Socrates in the Symposium is a Platonic portrait, a Platonic perspective on Socrates. I do
not think that this fact disadvantages it in relation to other portraits of Socrates found in
the Platonic dialogues. I do not accept the view of some scholars that a group of
“Socratic” or “early” Platonic dialogues contains a portrait of Socrates that has uniquely
strong historical credentials, and that in dialogues of a later period, including the
Symposium, Socrates becomes a “mouthpiece” for Plato. 2 Nor do I accept the view,
closely associated with this, that the “Socratic” dialogues are free of metaphysical
theories.3 Moreover, I do not believe that the presence in or absence from a dialogue of
certain metaphysical doctrines thought to be Platonic rather than Socratic can, by itself,
determine the historical accuracy of the portrait of Socrates contained in the dialogue.
In my view there are no dialogues, however early, that present a purely historical
portrait of Socrates, devoid of Platonic influence.4 In addition, there are no dialogues,
however late, in which Socrates appears, of which we can confidently claim that the
historical element in Plato’s portrait is entirely absent.5 Even in the earliest dialogues
claims to knowledge. For more on this incompatibility see my “The Socratic Problem” in H. H. Benson,
ed., The Blackwell Companion to Plato (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, forthcoming).
2
I follow the view of Charles Kahn in “Did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?” [Classical Quarterly 31
(1981), 305-20; reprinted in Hugh H. Benson, Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992, 35-52)]: “Even where the inspiration of Socrates is clear, the dialogues are all
Platonic.” (47) See my “Why Did Plato Write Socratic Dialogues?” in Mark McPherran, ed., Wisdom,
Ignorance and Virtue: New Essays in Socratic Studies (Apeiron 30, no. 4, 1997), 109-23.
3
See my “Socrates Metaphysician,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27 (2004), 1-14. There I argue,
following R. E. Allen, that several “Socratic” dialogues contain an early version of the theory of Forms. I
do not argue that these dialogues in general contain the same version of the theory that the so-called
“middle” dialogues do. In the Symposium, however, Alcibiades attributes that “Platonic” theory to a
Socrates who seems in other respects to be the Socrates of the “Socratic” dialogues.
4
I include here even the Apology, considered by many scholars the touchstone of historical interpretation.
See my “The Historicity of Plato’s Apology,” Polis 18 (2001), 41-57.
5
In my view one of the most important portraits of Socrates is one in which he is not named: the account of
the “Sophist of Noble Lineage” in the late Sophist, at 229e-230e. Another is the portrait of Socrates as a
“midwife” in the Theaetetus. A third is the portrait of Socrates in the late Philebus. Donald Davidson has
argued that the Socrates of the Philebus ask a Socratic question and uses the elenchus to answer it in much
the same way as did the Socrates of the “early” dialogues. [Donald Davidson, “Plato’s Philosopher,” in
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Plato brings his unmatched literary imagination and philosophical genius to the
interpretation of the philosophy of Socrates. Over the course of his career he offers a
number of different portraits, not all of which are fully consistent; but it does not follow
from the fact that one portrait is later than another that it is less faithful to the memory of
Socrates. Plato did not forget what Socrates was like after writing the so-called early
dialogues. He returned to the “problem” of Socrates again and again and offered portraits
of his mentor. To understand Plato’s view of Socrates we must consider all of these
portraits, whatever period of composition they occur in.
Several scholars accept the claim that the portrait of Socrates in the Symposium,
and in particular the portrait given in Alcibiades’s speech, is historical in character. A. R.
Lacey writes, “There are two places outside the Apology where Plato seems to be
speaking of the real Socrates: Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium (215A ff.) and
Socrates’ ‘autobiography’ in the Phaedo (96A ff).”6 Brickhouse and Smith state that
“Although the Symposium is generally regarded as a middle period work, the speech of
Alcibiades is regarded by most contemporary Socratic scholars as compatible with the
Socrates portrayed in the early dialogues.”7 Gregory Vlastos says, “Despite the
provenance of this composition from a dialogue of Plato’s middle period, its Socrates is
unmistakably the philosopher of the earlier one.”8 Thus even scholars such as Vlastos,
who defend a sharp distinction, indeed an incompatibility, between the historical Socrates

Terence Irwin and Martha Nussbaum, eds., Virtue, Love, and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos
(Edmonton, Alberta: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1995), 179-194, esp. 188-9.]
6
“Our Knowledge of Socrates,” in Gregory Vlastos, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City:
Doubleday and Company, 1971), 43. Lacey is critical of the claim of the Phaedo passage to be historical,
but not of the Symposium passage.
7
Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, Plato’s Socrates (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 105, n. 5.
8
Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 35. For
Vlastos, of course, the Socrates of the earlier dialogues just is the historical Socrates.
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of the “early” dialogues and the Platonic Socrates of the “middle” dialogues (including
the Symposium) have conceded that the portrait of Socrates in the Symposium is
historical. I want here to defend only a weaker claim: that it could be a portrait of the
historical Socrates, and not simply a Platonic creation.
Problems of Interpretation
It is a truism that every Platonic dialogue, however straightforward its structure,
offers problems of interpretation to the reader. The basic difficulty is that Plato speaks to
us only through his characters. Even a forensic speech, such as the Apology, or a simple
direct dialogue such as the Crito, which purport to present Socrates’ own words, give us
Socrates as depicted by Plato. In an indirect dialogue the content of a conversation is
transmitted through the voice of a narrator. In some indirect dialogues, such as the Lysis,
the narrator is Socrates. In others, such as the Symposium, it is a third party. We cannot
assume, as a general rule, that Socrates is a more truthful reporter, in particular
concerning himself, than others. When Socrates claims a bad memory in the Protagoras
(334d) as an excuse for ending the conversation, Alcibiades dismisses this remark as a
joke (336c-d), alluding indirectly to a persistent issue in interpreting Socrates’ remarks
about himself: his irony. I shall return to this issue below.
The complexities of interpretation are particularly great in the Symposium. The
outermost frame of the dialogue is a conversation between Apollodorus and an unnamed
companion. This conversation contains a description of Socrates and his effect on his
followers offered by Apollodorus, a devoted disciple. Within this outer frame there is an
inner one: an account, credited to Aristodemus, of the symposium of Agathon, which
Socrates attended. Within Aristodemus’ account Socrates is described not only by
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Aristodemus but also by Alcibiades. Also imbedded in Aristodemus’ account are some
self-characterizations given by Socrates, amounting to a self-portrait. To make matters
even more complex, Socrates offers a report of a conversation he had with one Diotima, a
priestess of Mantinea. This report contains several remarks about Socrates. The
interpretation of these remarks is made complicated by the fact that many interpreters,
myself included, think that Diotima, or at least this conversation between her and
Socrates, is a fiction. Within the context of the dialogue, she or it would be Socrates’
fiction; when we examine the dialogue from the perspective of the author, she or it would
be Plato’s.
I do not have a general theory that would explain the complex structure of this
dialogue. I would say this: the Symposium offers several characters the opportunity to
comment on Socrates’ wisdom, his character, and his effects on them. One of these
characters is Socrates himself. The elaborate structure allows others to say things about
Socrates, in some cases in Socrates’ presence, that it would be out of character for
Socrates to say about himself. (If Diotima is, as I think, an invented character, it gives
Socrates a chance to offer a description of himself without appearing to do so.) The
discrepancy between Socrates’ self-reports and the reports of others is ultimately
explained by an appeal to irony. I regard this appeal as highly significant.
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The Opening Pages of the Symposium; Apollodorus, Aristodemus, and Socrates’
“Trance”
The introductory conversation of the dialogue portrays Socrates as a charismatic
philosophical teacher.9 Apollodorus, the narrator of the dialogue, relates to an unnamed
companion a conversation he had recently had with one Glaucon, in which he told the
story of an earlier symposium at Agathon’s, on the occasion of Agathon’ victory in a
tragic festival. Apollodorus recites to his companion his comments to Glaucon
concerning the change that becoming a disciple of Socrates has wrought in his life:
it’s been less than three [years] that I’ve been Socrates’ companion and made it
my job to know exactly what he says and does each day. Before that, I simply
drifted aimlessly. Of course, I used to think that what I was doing was important,
but in fact I was the most worthless man on earth—as bad as you are at this very
moment: I used to think philosophy was the last thing a man should do. (173a)
He then repeats the same thoughts to his companion:
my greatest pleasure comes from philosophical conversation, even if I’m only a
listener, whether or not I think it will be to my advantage. All other talk,
especially talk of rich businessmen like you, bores me to tears, and I’m sorry for
you and your friends because you think your affairs are important when really
they’re totally trivial. (173c-d)
Neither the companion nor Glaucon is a convert to philosophy. Both are interested in
hearing about Agathon’s party, but neither is a follower of Socrates. Their response to
Apollodorus’ enthusiasm for Socrates is disbelief. Glaucon, after Apollodorus’ remarks
“Teacher” is not the right word, but I know of no better. Socrates denied that he was a teacher, because he
claimed to have nothing to teach, but his followers looked to him for something more important than
philosophical theory. As I shall suggest below, the proper term for Socrates might be “mystagogos.”
9
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to him about the value of philosophy, says simply, “Stop joking, Apollodorus” (173a).
The companion’s response is longer, but equally dismissive:
You’ll never change, Apollodorus! Always nagging, even at yourself! I do believe
you think everybody—yourself first of all—is totally worthless, except, of course,
Socrates. I don’t know exactly why you came to be called “the maniac,” but you
certainly talk like one, always furious with everyone, including yourself—but not
with Socrates! (173d)
Both Glaucon and the companion urge Apollodorus to dispense with his Jeremiad and get
on with his account of the party.
Apollodorus speaks the language of the convert: he has found his life’s meaning
in following Socrates. Glaucon has not seen the light, which is why Apollodorus says he
is at that moment as bad as Glaucon was before his conversion. His companion describes
him by a well-known nickname, manikos (173d6),10 to indicate that he is mad for
Socrates and philosophy. It was one of the characteristics of the historical Socrates that
he inspired this kind of loyalty in his followers. In the Apology Chaerephon is perhaps the
outstanding but by no means the only example of such zeal. The Crito depicts Crito as a
devoted follower of Socrates. Though Plato’s dialogues feature adversarial arguments
more than the friendlier conversations that Xenophon emphasizes, Plato by no means
ignores the gentler aspects of philosophical conversation, especially with younger
interlocutors.11 In any case, it is an undeniable fact that the historical Socrates had a

10

For manikos in preference to malakos see R. G. Bury, The Symposium of Plato (Cambridge: W. Heffer
and Sons Ltd.) 6, n.
11
W.T. Schmid, “Socrates' Practice of Elenchus in the Charmides," Ancient Philosophy 1 (1981), 141-47;
reprinted in W.J. Prior, ed., Socrates: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers (London: Routledge,
1996, 4 v.) v. 3, pp. 20-27. Gregory Vlastos, no doubt thinking about the hostility of Callicles at the end of
the Gorgias, overemphasized the adversarial character of Socrates’ conversations when he wrote, “He has

7/35

8/3/2022

The Portrait of Socrates in Plato’s Symposium (William J. Prior)
number of disciples who were unstinting in their admiration, indeed their love, for him;
this is a point made not only in the Symposium but also in the Phaedo.
The conversation Apollodorus recounts was told him by one Aristodemus, who
was also a Socratic acolyte. Apollodorus describes him as “obsessed with Socrates—one
of the worst cases at that time” (173b; the Greek says he was one of Socrates’ lovers,
using the term erastes at b3). Aristodemus went so far in following Socrates as to imitate
him in what might be thought of as an inessential trait, his habit of going barefoot,12 and
when Socrates invites him to come along uninvited to Agathon’s dinner his response is,
“I’ll do whatever you say” (174b). The response of these two followers of Socrates raises
the question, what is it about him that elicits such a passionate commitment? Why does
Aristodemus imitate even Socrates’ typical lack of footwear? Why does Apollodorus
make it his job “to know exactly what he says and does each day?” (173a) How has
Socrates managed to convince them, as he argues in the Apology, that they must put the
care of their souls ahead of the pursuit of wealth (30b-c), that life without philosophical
inquiry is not worth living (38a)? Alcibiades’ speech will later attest to this power of
Socrates’ message on at least some of those who hear it.
The strangeness of Socrates is enhanced by what happens as he and Aristodemus
head off to the party. Socrates becomes lost in thought and falls behind. Aristodemus
arrives without him, and Agathon has to welcome the uninvited guest with a deft account
of his attempt on the previous day to find him and invite him. When Socrates does not

to fight every inch of the way for any assent he gets, and he gets it, so to speak, at the point of a dagger.”
“The Paradox of Socrates,” in Vlastos, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, N. Y: Doubleday and
Company, 1971), 2. On the contrary, most of Socrates’ interlocutors follow willingly as he leads them
down the garden path.
12
It is said that Wittgenstein, among recent philosophers, had this effect on his students: they copied his
mannerisms and his attire.
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appear, Agathon sends a slave out find him. The slave reports that he is lodged in a
neighbor’s porch and won’t come. Aristodemus explains that this is Socrates’ manner: he
stands motionless from time to time, then returns to his previous activity. Eventually,
Socrates arrives in the midst of the meal, and Agathon greets him with the following
invitation: “Socrates, come lie down next to me. Who knows, if I touch you, I may catch
a bit of the wisdom that came to you under my neighbor’s porch. It’s clear you’ve seen
the light. If you hadn’t, you’d still be standing there” (175d).
What is strange about this remark of Agathon’s is that Aristodemus had not said
that Socrates’ “trances” had anything to do with seeking wisdom, or that he ceased them
when he had found the answer to the problem that had perplexed him. [Apollodorus’
narration does describe Socrates as “lost in thought” (174d), but Aristodemus doesn’t say
that to Agathon.] Agathon, based apparently on what he already knows about Socrates
(who is, after all, a dinner-guest and presumably a friend), has inferred that the Socratic
“trance” is an episode of deep philosophical thought, and that it has had a positive
outcome. Socrates is apparently known, at least to Agathon, as someone whose thought
does have, on occasion at least, a positive outcome; Agathon sees Socrates, that is, as the
possessor of at least some philosophical wisdom. Socrates’ response to Agathon, that
wisdom cannot be transmitted by contact, as water can be transferred from a fuller to an
emptier cup by means of a thread, is doubtless significant, because it raises only to leave
open the question how, if at all, the kind of wisdom Socrates apparently possesses can be
transmitted.
The opening pages of the Symposium, then, raise three interesting points about
Socrates. First, we learn that he has a number of devoted disciples, people who have
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become convinced that following Socrates and listening to his conversations is the best
thing one can do with one’s life—people Socrates has converted to the life of
philosophical inquiry. We do not learn at this point what leads those disciples to follow
him, apart from the fact that it is his practice of philosophy. Second, we learn that
Socrates has the unusual habit of becoming distracted from the task at hand and entering
into a meditative state, a trance, a point that will later be confirmed by Alcibiades (220cd). Third, we learn that Agathon believes that Socrates is the possessor of at least some
wisdom, though what the content of that wisdom might be we are not told. This last belief
is confirmed by Socrates’ own remarks in what follows. Each of these points will receive
confirmation in Alcibiades’ speech later in the dialogue.
Socrates’ Self-Portrait: his Encounter with Diotima
Socrates himself confirms Agathon’s judgment when he states that he has
knowledge in at least one area: ta erotika, erotics. Readers of other Socratic dialogues
will be familiar, as presumably were those who were acquainted with Socrates in life,
with his denials of wisdom (cf. e.g. Apology 21b, Laches 186e, Republic I, 337e). They
will also be familiar with his expression of interest in eros. When the symposiasts seek a
conversational topic after dinner, and Eryximachus proposes that they offer encomia to
Eros, Socrates agrees to this topic, saying that he does not claim to know anything except
ta erotika (177e1). This passage is unusual, however, in that Socrates claims that ta
erotika are an exception to his disavowal of knowledge.13 It is one more piece to the
puzzle of Socrates developed in the first few pages of the Symposium. Exactly what the
nature of his knowledge is, or how far it extends, are questions that must await later

Socrates describes his own wisdom as “lowly and disputable, like a dream” at 175e2-3, a passage
dripping with irony—but he doesn’t deny that he has some.
13
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developments.14 At present, however, I would only note that this admission of knowledge
is a significant departure from the stance of Socrates in the “Socratic” dialogues, whose
disavowal of knowledge was unqualified.
When Socrates emerges from silence late in the dialogue, after several of the other
speakers have offered their praises to eros, it is in the mode of the elenctic examiner
familiar from the dialogues generally recognized as Socratic. Before the start of
Agathon’s speech he begins an examination of Agathon that Phaedrus puts an end to,
stating (no doubt correctly) that once Socrates gets started asking questions it will be
impossible to return to the encomia (194a-d). When Agathon has finished his speech
Socrates begins a second examination of him, with Phaedrus’ permission, on the content
of his speech (199b-c). This time he is able to carry his questioning to conclusion,
without interruption, and the result is one that readers of other dialogues will find
familiar: “It turns out, Socrates” Agathon confesses, “I didn’t know what I was talking
about in that speech” (201c).
Now, however, we are introduced to another aspect of Socrates: his education in
erotics at the hands of Diotima. According to Socrates, Diotima is a Mantinean woman, a
priestess,15 by her own admission one who is knowledgeable about eros (202b-c).
Diotima conducts an examination of Socrates that recalls his examination of Agathon
(201e). At the end of her examination of Socrates Diotima offers the famous account of
14

It might be that knowledge of erotics is simply knowledge of the nature of eros—knowledge that is, of
the nature of the desire for the Good or the Beautiful, as Socrates variously describes the object of this
pursuit. Since Love, Eros, is defined at 204b as love of wisdom, philosophy, and since the object of this
love is all of reality, the domain of erotics would turn out to be the same as that of philosophy. Socrates’
interest in erotics would thus be identical to his interest in philosophy. It might be, however, that erotics
includes the object of eros as well as the desire. I shall argue below that Alcibiades describes Socrates as
one who has attained knowledge of at least a limited range of Forms; nowhere, however, is Socrates
portrayed as in possession of all philosophical wisdom. Only the Philosopher-King has that.
15
Though not explicitly called such, as Rowe notes (173); the word Mantinike, “from Mantinea,” echoes
mantike, “the art of the prophet,” as Bury states (94 n.).
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the soul’s ascent from the love of a single beautiful body to the love of the Form of
Beauty itself. This ascent has several stages: the love of a single beautiful body, the love
of all bodies, the love of the soul, the love of (ethical?) practices and laws, the love of
knowledge, and finally the love of Beauty. During the course of this ascent the language
of love is replaced by the language of (intellectual) vision. Diotima expresses doubt as to
whether Socrates can follow her throughout the entire ascent: “Even you, Socrates, could
probably come to be initiated into these rites of love. But as for the purpose of these rites
when they are done correctly—that is the final and highest mystery, and I don’t know if
you are capable of it” (210a).16
Diotima describes this ascent in the language of the mysteries (209e-210a). In the
Eleusinian mysteries the initiate, or mystes, is led through stages to the ultimate
revelation by a mystagogos, a guide who has previously been initiated and who has seen
the ultimate mystery. Diotima seems to be such a mystagogos. If so, this would imply
that she has seen the highest beauty in the ascent she describes, the Form of Beauty itself.
Interestingly, though Socrates claims to be the author of the theory of Forms at Phaedo
100b and Parmenides 130b, to the best of my knowledge neither he nor any other
character in the dialogues, including Diotima, ever explicitly claims to have had the sort
of experience of the Forms that the theory describes. Diotima’s remarks strongly suggest
that she has, however, and we may say, I think, that no one gives clearer indications of
having seen a Form than she does.
It is not altogether clear, however, that she served as Socrates’ mystagogos. It is
possible that she did lead him on the upward path that culminates in the experience of
I believe that Diotima expresses doubt only about Socrates’ ability to attain the summit of the ascent, the
vision of the Form, and not about his ability to undertake the ascent at all. I shall discuss this point further
below.
16
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Beauty. Socrates does state that Diotima taught him the art of love (201d), but the
meaning if this claim is somewhat uncertain (see n. 14 above). As Socrates relates his
education at Diotima’s hands, he says that she described to him the nature of the pursuit
of the ultimate object of love, but he does not claim that she actually led him to Beauty
itself. Socrates says at the end of the ascent passage that he was persuaded by Diotima
(pepeismai, 212b1). He does not say that he has made the ascent himself and had the
ultimate experience of “seeing” Beauty with the eye of the soul.17 Thus, his status as an
initiate into the mysteries is somewhat in doubt at the end of Diotima’s speech. Diotima’s
speech gives us a picture of Socrates as one who has advanced from a state of ignorance
under the guidance of a knowledgeable teacher to understanding of the nature of love and
partial but probably not complete understanding of the nature of beauty. We cannot
claim, on the basis of what Diotima says, that Socrates had direct, experiential knowledge
of Beauty itself. It is this ultimate knowledge that Diotima describes as wisdom.
According to a well-known Socratic claim, the priority of definition principle, one
cannot know the properties of an object until one knows that that object is. Without
knowledge of the form of Beauty itself one could not know the properties of Beauty.
Socrates on occasion makes use of this principle to disavow knowledge. The Socrates of
Diotima’s speech might be said to have “indirect” knowledge of Beauty, inasmuch as
Diotima does transmit to him a verbal account of the nature of the Form (211a-d); but
Plato’s name for such a cognitive state would surely be not “knowledge” but “right
opinion.” The Socrates of the Symposium might be learned in comparison with the

17

That there is an experiential component to knowledge of the Forms, that the Forms are the objects of
what Kant would call “intellectual intuition,” is clear. Even if one were educated thoroughly in the nature
of a Form by one who was herself knowledgeable, without the attainment of this intellectual vision one
could not claim to have knowledge of the Form, but at most true opinion.
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Socrates who disavows all knowledge, but he would not have attained wisdom, according
to this interpretation.
The Historicity of Diotima
The reading offered to this point of the reported conversation between Socrates
and Diotima has been a literal one, one that has taken for granted the existence of
Diotima and the actual occurrence of her discussion with Socrates. Before I turn to the
more positive account of Socratic wisdom contained in Alcibiades’ speech, however, I
must consider the question of the historicity of Diotima. Diotima, strictly speaking, does
not appear as a character in the dialogue; it is Socrates who reports on his earlier
conversation with her. 18 Admittedly, Socrates gives no indication that she is anything
other than a real person, or that her speech is anything but an actual speech. These claims,
however, have been generally rejected by scholars, who have claimed that either Diotima
or her speech are fictional.19 Now fictional characters are rare in Plato’s dialogues; but
there are powerful reasons for believing that this is an exception. The strongest reason is
that if the speech and character are not fictional, this otherwise unknown person would
have been in possession of the Platonic theory of Forms, and would have communicated
it to Socrates, in which case the history of philosophy would have to be rewritten.

18

Of course, the same might be said of Socrates, whose words are recounted by Aristodemus and,
ultimately, Apollodorus. Still, the impression created for at least this reader is that the outer frames of the
dialogue fade from view, leaving us with Socrates and his companions at dinner. Even if Socrates is treated
as an actual participant in the dialogue, however, Diotima does not quite attain that status. She is not a
dinner guest, as even Alcibiades is (though an uninvited one), but someone whose views are recounted by a
dinner guest.
19
Bury (xxxix) explicitly states that she is a fiction. Rowe says that her fictionality is established “beyond
any reasonable doubt” (173). Dover brings out basis for this claim when he says that, though we cannot
determine whether she is fictional or not, but it does not matter, because even if she existed she is hardly
likely to have held the Platonic theory of Forms, which we find stated at the top of the ascent (137).
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Why would Plato have put a version of the theory of Forms in the mouth of a
Mantinean priestess?20 This is a question that must be examined from two perspectives:
that internal to the context of the dialogue, and that external to it. I shall first consider the
external perspective; that is, that of the author of the dialogue. I am aware that whatever I
say here must be somewhat speculative. This much seems clear, however. Plato wanted
to present a solution to the problem of the nature of love that is the theme of the dialogue.
He believed that the theory of Forms, with the accompanying theory of desire, provided
such a solution. Despite the fact that in the Phaedo and Parmenides Plato
straightforwardly attributes the theory of Forms to Socrates, here, for whatever reason, he
declines to do so. Thus, he uses Diotima as the propounder of the theory. Diotima
functions, with one qualification, as a kind of dea ex machina, akin to Athena in
Aeschylus’ Eumenides. She is an expository device.
If Plato did not see fit to put this version of the theory of Forms in Socrates’
mouth, however, he nonetheless put it in Socrates’ ear. The theory, the dialogue tells us,
was presented by Diotima to Socrates. Socrates is presented, if not as someone who has
experiential, first hand knowledge of the form of Beauty, at least as someone familiar
with the idea of a Form and the process of ascent to it. It is implausible in the extreme
that so careful a writer as Plato would have lost sight of the dramatic context of the
dialogue at this climactic point and not noticed that the expositor of the theory of Forms
was expounding it to Socrates. If, as some scholars have suggested, Plato intended the
Socrates of the Symposium to be the historical Socrates, then he intended the reader of the

I say “a version” first because Diotima’s account is limited to a single Form, that of Beauty, but second,
because I do not think there is a definitive statement of the theory of Forms, as opposed to a number of
variant formulations, in the dialogues. If we think there is a canonical formulation of the theory, it is
because we have constructed it out of the several formulations Plato offers us.
20

15/35

8/3/2022

The Portrait of Socrates in Plato’s Symposium (William J. Prior)
dialogue to see the historical Socrates as familiar with a version of the theory of Forms.
Those scholars who reject the idea that the historical Socrates might have been familiar
with the theory of Forms, on the ground that this theory is Plato’s and that it would be an
anachronism to make Socrates aware of it must reject the idea that the portrait of Socrates
in the Symposium, or at least this part of it, is historical.21
Looking at this conversation between Diotima and Socrates from the perspective
of the author, then, it appears to have been Plato’s intention to portray Socrates as
familiar with a version of the theory of Forms. The claim that Diotima was a fiction, from
this perspective, means that she was a character devised by Plato to make Socrates aware
of that theory. Diotima will be Plato’s fiction, as the theory of Forms is his theory.
Diotima will be Plato’s device to insert his own solution to the problem of eros
anachronistically into a dialogue with a particular historical setting and cast of characters.
If Diotima is a surrogate for Plato, as she appears to be from the external perspective,
then it would seem that Plato, through his surrogate, is inserting himself into the dialogue
as the teacher of the person who, in life, was his mentor. One must wonder what his
purpose was in doing this.
What happens when we examine the conversation from within the context of the
dialogue itself? The suspicion that Diotima’s speech, if not Diotima herself, is a fiction is
first aroused by her elenchus of Socrates at 201d-202e. Socrates has just conducted a
similar elenchus of Agathon, leading to Agathon’s confession, noted above, that he didn’t
know what he was talking about. A less suave host than Agathon might have found this
public discomfiture on the occasion of his great triumph somewhat embarrassing. One
suspects that Socrates invented a similar conversation, with himself cast in Agathon’s
21

As does Dover (10).
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role, to ease any embarrassment Agathon may have felt.22 This suspicion is increased by
the fact that Diotima’s refutation of Socrates takes the form of an elenchus. The
arguments attributed to Diotima by Socrates resemble nothing so much as the kind of
argument for which Socrates was famous. The elenchus is so closely associated with
Socrates that the term “elenchus” is often found conjoined with Socrates’ name. History
in fact shows us one master of this practice, Socrates. Socrates, in his account of his
conversation with Diotima, would have us believe that there were two. It seems more
reasonable to believe that there was only one, and that the elenctic examination he
attributes to Diotima is actually his own.23
If the first part of Diotima’s speech is a Socratic fiction, what can we say about
the second part, in which Diotima lays out the path to Beauty? From the perspective
internal to the dialogue, it would seem most reasonable to attribute it to Socrates. (If
Diotima herself is a Socratic fiction, the attribution of the speech to Socrates would be
inescapable.) This means that, again from the internal perspective, we should credit
Socrates, if not with the entire theory of Forms, then at least with experiential knowledge
of the Form of Beauty. This would reduce to nothing the difference between Diotima’s
understanding and Socrates’. (It would also make Diotima’s remark about Socrates’
inability to attain the highest revelation a case of Socratic irony.) The metaphysics of
ascent Diotima expounds would be Socrates’ metaphysics. Socrates himself would be, as

Thus Cornford: “By a masterstroke of delicate courtesy he avoids making his host look foolish. He
pretends that he had spoken of Eros in similar terms to Diotima . . . and he represents the criticism as
administered by Diotima to himself.” “The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” in Gregory Vlastos,
ed., Plato II: Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion (Garden City: Doubleday and Company,
1971), 122.
23
This elenchus would be unusual, then, in that Socrates both administers and is the recipient of the
elenchus. Perhaps, however, it would not be unique. The alter-ego Socrates introduces to examine him at
Hippias Major 286c seems to be Socrates himself, thinly disguised. If the Hippias Major is authentic, this
may be a parallel to the introduction of Diotima in this dialogue.
22
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he suggests Diotima is, a mystagogos, one who has seen the form of Beauty and can lead
others to it. It is quite in keeping with the character of Socrates as portrayed in other
dialogues that he would conceal this aspect of his philosophical ability behind the mask
of another person, who may be his own creation.
Let me put my point in somewhat different terms. Diotima’s speech shows the
reader a two-stage process for the acquisition of knowledge. In the first stage, the
elenchus, the interlocutor is relieved by his examiner of the pretence to knowledge and is
made aware of his ignorance. In the second stage, the interlocutor is led by the examiner
to knowledge or at least, since knowledge cannot be second hand, to true opinion. That is
what Socrates describes Diotima as doing for him; that is what Socrates does for Agathon
in particular and the other symposiasts as well. This two-stage process seems to me to be
just the process described in the doctrine of Recollection. It is generally thought that this
doctrine reflects a Platonic understanding of Socrates’ philosophical activity. If the
Socrates of the Symposium is the historical Socrates, then it must reflect a Socratic
understanding as well. Socrates and Plato would be in harmony on the possibility of the
acquisition of knowledge, at least to this extent. There is a further point. Knowledge isn’t
perfected until an experience of the object occurs. When Diotima expresses doubt about
Socrates’ ability to attain to a vision of Beauty itself, this is what she doubts. The ascent
passage tells us that one must be led by a mystagogos to that vision, but it does not
explain what the vision consists in. An intriguing, but admittedly extremely speculative
suggestion would be that the kind of Socratic trance described both by Aristodemus
(174d-175b) and Alcibiades (220c-d) culminates in the attainment of that vision. This
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claim would tie the speech of Diotima both to earlier and later accounts of Socrates in the
dialogue.
To sum up. The literal sense of the text of the speech of Diotima would attribute
to Socrates at least a second-hand familiarity with the Form of Beauty. If Diotima, or her
speech, is a fiction, he may have more than that. If Diotima is Plato’s fiction, as the
external perspective would indicate, that need not alter our understanding of Socrates’
knowledge. If Diotima is Socrates’ fiction, however, as the internal perspective indicates,
the content of her speech would have to be attributed to him. Can these two perspectives
be reconciled? Can we harmonize the view that attributes the theory of Forms to Plato
with one that attributes at least some experiential knowledge of Forms to Socrates? To
the exploration of this question I now turn.
Alcibiades’ Speech
Alcibiades in his speech tells us a good deal about himself. He also tells us a good
deal about the reactions to Socrates of his devoted followers. In this respect it recalls the
introductory conversations of Apollodorus and Aristodemus. What I want to focus on
here, however, is what the speech of Alcibiades tells us about Socrates. I shall say very
little about the centerpiece of Alcibiades’ encomium, his account of his attempted
seduction of Socrates. Though this story tells us much about erotic practices in ancient
Athens and the character of Alcibiades (as well as being a great story in its own right), its
value for my purposes is that it corroborates Alcibiades’ account of Socrates’ virtue and
enables us to locate him on Diotima’s ladder of ascent. I want to focus instead on the
central image that Alcibiades uses for Socrates: the image of the statues of Silenus that he
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says are for sale everywhere in Athens. These statues, as Alcibiades describes them, are
ugly on the surface but carry agalmata (statues, images) of the gods within them:
I’ll try to praise Socrates, my friends, but I’ll have to use an image. And though
he may think I’m trying to make fun of him, I assure you my image is no joke: it
aims at the truth. Look at him! Isn’t he just like a statue of Silenus? You know the
kind of statue I mean; you’ll find them in any shop in town. It’s a Silenus sitting,
his flute or his pipes in his hands, and it’s hollow. It’s split right down the middle,
and inside it’s full of tiny statues of the gods. (215a-b; cf. 216e-217a)
He applies the Silenus analogy both to Socrates and to his logoi: like Socrates
himself, his logoi appear ludicrous, comical on the outside, but they contain images of
virtue within:
even his ideas and arguments are just like those hollow statues of Silenus.
If you listen to his arguments, at first they’d strike you as totally ridiculous;
they’re clothed in words as coarse as the hides worn by the most vulgar satyrs.
He’s always going on about pack asses, or blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners;
he’s always making the same tired old points in the same tired old words. If you
are foolish, or simply unfamiliar with him, you’d find it impossible not to laugh at
his arguments. But if you see them when they open up like the statues, if you go
beyond their surface, you’ll realize that no other arguments make any sense.
They’re truly worthy of a god, bursting with figures of virtue inside. They’re of
great—no, of the greatest—importance for anyone who wants to become a truly
good man. (221d-222a)
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Alcibiades’ account places Socrates at the very top of Diotima’s ladder of ascent;
it describes him as one who has knowledge of Beauty itself.24 Alcibiades does not
explicitly emphasize Socrates’ wisdom; instead, he repeatedly stresses his divinity.25 First
of all, there is the comparison with the Silenus image itself, which contains within it
divine images (215b, 216e-217a). Then Alcibiades compares Socrates’ speech to the
melodies of Marsyas: “his melodies have in themselves the power to possess and so
reveal those people who are ready for the god and his mysteries. That’s because his
melodies are themselves divine” (215c). Socrates, in other words, is not only wise
himself; he has the power to lead others to wisdom. This is the power of the mystagogos.
In concluding his encomium he remarks that Socrates has no human parallel, but must be
compared to Silenus and the satyrs (221d), and that his arguments are “worthy of a god”
(222a).
Alcibiades’ Portrait of Socrates and Diotima’s Account of Wisdom
Alcibiades’ description of Socrates is that of a wise man whose wisdom is
cloaked in the ironic veil of a satyr. If we leave aside for a moment the apparent
discrepancy between Diotima’s placement and Alcibiades’ placement of Socrates on the
ladder of ascent, we can see that what Alcibiades says about Socrates corresponds very
closely with what Diotima says about the acquisition of wisdom. Before she describes the
ascent to the Form of Beauty Diotima offers an account of the human condition. All
human beings are pregnant, both in body and soul (206c). Those whose pregnancy is
more physical than psychological seek immortality through reproduction (206e-207a).
24

This is where Paul Friedländer places him: Plato: the Dialogues, Second and Third Periods (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1969) 30.
25
It is only the person who reaches the top of the ladder of ascent and enters the presence of Beauty itself
who attains divine status in Diotima’s account (211d-212b), who is beloved by the gods and immortal (if
any human can become so.)
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Those whose pregnancy is more psychological seek to bring to birth not physical
offspring, but “wisdom and the rest of virtue” (209a3-4). The poets are included among
those who fall into this category (at 209d Diotima mentions Homer and Hesiod as
examples), as are statesmen and managers of households (here he mentions Lycurgus and
Solon). The virtue of these people is referred to as “moderation and justice” (a8). All
begetting, Diotima claims, must take place in the presence of beauty; the person who is
pregnant primarily in soul therefore seeks beautiful souls in the presence of which he or
she can bring forth virtuous deeds. When he finds such a person the psychologically
pregnant person “tries to educate him” (209c1-2). The presence of a beautiful soul leads
to the conception and birth of what the pregnant person “has been carrying inside him for
ages” (c3). The person who has given birth and the beloved then nurture the offspring as
those who are physically pregnant give birth to and nurture a physical child. But these
psychological offspring are “more beautiful and immortal” (c6-7) than human children:
anyone who could produce the poems of Homer or the Lycurgan constitution would
rather do that than reproduce physically.
Now when Diotima says to Socrates that “even you” might be introduced into
such mysteries, it is this account to which she is referring. The phrase “even you” seems
like an insult, but it is not. For Diotima is placing Socrates, at least potentially, among the
great educators of Greece. By saying that “even he” might be initiated into these
mysteries she is saying that Socrates belongs with those who whose pregnancy is more
psychological than physical, that in the presence of a psychologically beautiful beloved
he might give birth to “ideas and arguments about virtue—the qualities a virtuous man
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should have” (209b8). She is claiming that Socrates, like everyone, is fertile, or at least
potentially so: in the presence of beauty he will produce intellectual offspring.26
This account, the one that precedes the description of the ascent, seems congruent
with Alcibiades’ description of Socrates. As Alcibiades describes Socrates, he was not
overly interested in Alcibiades’ physical beauty, but rather in his soul. As a result, he did
not wish to have sex with him, but rather he “tried to educate him.” Alcibiades describes
Socrates as “containing images of the gods” within himself, images of divine virtue
which are presumably represented by arguments; Diotima describes the psychologically
pregnant person as teeming with ideas and arguments about virtue, ideas that he or she
brings to birth in the presence of another. These arguments, Diotima says, are concerned
with “the qualities a virtuous man should have”; Alcibiades says Socrates’ arguments are
“of the greatest importance” for anyone who wishes to become good.
The lower stages of Diotima’s account of the ascent to the Form of Beauty
recapitulate the account just given of physical and psychological pregnancy. In the lowest
stage of the ascent, one falls in love with a single beautiful body (210a). From this stage
one progresses to the love of all beautiful bodies (210b). Only at stage 3 (b-c), when one
comes to appreciate the superior value of the soul and to love it in preference to the body
does one leave the domain of physical pregnancy and enter the realm of psychological.
Stage 4 (c) is concerned with “activities and laws,” a phrase that recalls the earlier
account of statesmanship, justice, Solon and Lycurgus. Stage 5, the stage immediately
preceding the ultimate revelation of Beauty, is concerned with knowledge. The lover will
“move on to various kinds of knowledge” and “see the beauty of knowledge” (c6-7). This

This contradicts Socrates’ claim in the Theaetetus (149a-151d) that he is a barren midwife of the ideas of
others. Cf. Dover, 151, and Sheffield,
26
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stage is the first that lacks a parallel in Diotima’s earlier account, unless we count the
reference to “wisdom” at 209a3. That reference, however, was to phronesis, which we
might think of as specifically practical wisdom. This one is to epistemai, kinds of
knowledge; presumably this includes theoretical as well as practical knowledge. It is
clear that at this stage we have entered the domain of the philosopher; the Socrates of
Republic VI-VII, concerned with the mathematical sciences, belongs here. Unfortunately,
neither Diotima’s speech nor Alcibiades’ gives us any indication of how we are to situate
the Socrates of this dialogue with regard to this stage of the ascent.
In other respects, however, Alcibiades’ encomium to Socrates gives us an
indication as to where he would place Socrates on the ascent to the Beautiful. Alcibiades’
story of his failed seduction of Socrates tells us that Socrates is above the initial stage of
the ascent, in which one falls in love with a single beautiful body (though, as one
pregnant in mind more than in body, Socrates would be expected to produce beautiful
discourses rather than to be physically passionate; cf. 210a). Alcibiades tells us that
Socrates has treated others in much the same way as he treated him (222b), so we must
suppose that Socrates has risen above the second stage, in which one becomes a lover of
all beautiful bodies. Socrates offers Alcibiades the promise of educational advice instead
of sex, so we may assume that he has at least reached the stage of valuing a person’s soul
more highly than his body (218e-219b; note Alcibiades’ comment at 216d-e that Socrates
cares nothing for physical beauty). The next stage of the ascent, as we have seen,
concerns practices and laws. If we connect the concern with laws to Diotima’s comment
about Lycurgus and Solon (209d-e), we may say that this stage is concerned with
discourse about virtue. The poets and lawgivers of Greece were concerned with the
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education of youth. So, according to Alcibiades, is Socrates. Not only does Socrates have
logoi about virtue to offer, however, he is uniquely virtuous himself.
Socrates’ attainment of each of these stages is also attested by other dialogues.
Socrates’ discussion of virtue is the focus of too many dialogues to require comment. He
is in addition presented by Plato as a uniquely virtuous person, especially (but not
exclusively) in the events surrounding his trial. The Charmides shows us a Socrates
bowled over by Charmides’ physical beauty, but still with the presence of mind to ask
whether the youth also has a beautiful soul (154d). At the start of the Protagoras (309bd) Socrates tells an unnamed companion that the wisdom of Protagoras so eclipsed the
physical beauty of Alcibiades that, though he was present when Socrates and Protagoras
conversed, Socrates forgot about him most of the time. The picture Alcibiades presents of
Socrates is thus far consistent with that of the other Socratic dialogues as well as with
Socrates’ self-portrait in his account of his conversation with Diotima, and would justify
placing him fairly high up on the ladder of ascent. Up to this point, what Alcibiades
claims is what Diotima concedes: that Socrates might be able to be initiated into the
“lower mysteries.” Diotima, in fact, puts Socrates on the threshold to the final stage;
Alcibiades tells us that he crossed that threshold.
From Alcibiades’ perspective, at least, Socrates has attained that life promised by
Diotima to the one who successfully completes the ascent. He has attained favor with the
gods and thus a kind of immortality. Not only that, but I think we may safely claim that
Socrates played the role in Alcibiades’ life that he describes Diotima as playing, or at
least describing, in his: he served as Alcibiades’ mystagogos. If Alcibiades was unable to
complete the ascent, that was due to his own weakness (216b-c) and not, by his own
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admission, to any defect in Socrates’ arguments. Socrates speaks of Diotima as one who
is unenlightened speaks of one who has attained enlightenment. Alcibiades speaks of
Socrates in the same way. Socrates’ does not object to Alcibiades’ portrait of him, and
since he has been invited by Alcibiades to correct him at any point if he disagrees with
Alcibiades’ description (214e-215a), his silence may be taken to imply his consent to the
portrait.27
Alcibiades’ account of Socrates’ wisdom makes it easy to locate him on
Diotima’s ladder of ascent. In evaluating his claims we must remember three things.
First, Alcibiades has not heard Socrates’ account of Diotima’s speech and therefore
cannot explicitly comment on it (though his speech does in fact constitute a kind of
implicit commentary). Second, Alcibiades looks at Socrates as one who is at a lower
position on the ladder of ascent looks at one higher up, while Diotima looks down at him,
presumably, from above. Third, Diotima’s view of Socrates pre-dates his instruction by
her, whereas Alcibiades’ must post-date that instruction. (If we think of the Socratic
account of Diotima’s education of him as fictional, we may say that Alcibiades’ account
of his relationship with Socrates must post-date Socrates’ enlightenment, however and
whenever it may have occurred.)
The Appeal to Irony
Diotima claimed that the person who attained to the intellectual vision of Beauty
would have divine favor and would give birth to true virtue. Now there is a well-known
paradox of Plato’s portrait of Socrates in the “Socratic” dialogues that is based on three
incompatible propositions:
Given Socrates’ earlier criterion for proper encomia, that the encomiast not heap on the subject all
manner of praise but confine himself to the truth, (198d-199b) we could expect him to object if Alcibiades
attributed to him properties he did not possess.
27
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1) Socrates appears to the reader to be virtuous (and perhaps uniquely so),
2) Socrates himself believes that virtue is knowledge, and
3) Socrates denies that he has the sort of knowledge that virtue requires.
Alcibiades resolves this conundrum not by denying that Socrates is virtuous, but by
treating his disavowal of knowledge as ironic:
To begin with, he’s crazy about beautiful boys; he constantly follows them around
in a perpetual daze. Also, he likes to say he’s ignorant and knows nothing. Isn’t
this just like Silenus? Of course it is. And all this is just on the surface, like the
outsides of those statues of Silenus. I wonder, my fellow drinkers, if you have any
idea what a sober and temperate man he proves to be once you have looked
inside. Believe me, it couldn’t matter less to him whether a boy is beautiful. You
can’t imagine how little he cares whether a person is beautiful, or rich, or famous
in any other way that most people admire. He considers all these other
possessions beneath contempt, and that’s exactly how he considers all of us as
well. In public, I tell you, his life is one big game—a game of irony. I don’t know
if any of you have seen him when he’s serious. But I once caught him when he
was open like Silenus’ statues, and I had a glimpse of the figures he keeps within:
they were so godlike—so bright and beautiful, so utterly amazing—that I no
longer had a choice—I just had to do whatever he told me (216d-217a; my
emphasis).
Alcibiades took Socrates’ expression of erotic attachment to youths at face value,
as an indication of sexual desire, and found, to his embarrassment but also to his
admiration, that it was ironic. Socrates was not filled with sexual desire; rather, he was
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filled with moral virtue. Likewise, he suggests, the famous Socratic profession of
ignorance is ironic. He does not indicate here what Socrates contains within himself
instead of ignorance, but it seems reasonable to claim that what Alcibiades has in mind,
in parallel with the godlike virtue mentioned above, are the godlike logoi mentioned at
221d-222a. Again, though Alcibiades does not explicitly use the term “wisdom” here,
Socrates’ possession of divine logoi should be seen as tantamount to his possession of
wisdom.
The wisdom that Alcibiades attributes to Socrates is incompatible with the
ignorance that Socrates professes in the so-called “early” or “Socratic” dialogues.
Alcibiades’ reconciles the two Socratic stances, as noted above, by his invocation of
irony. What is the nature of this irony? I think this question must be divided into two.
First, there is the irony involved in Socrates’ disavowal of wisdom. This does not seem to
me to be the complex irony Vlastos attributes to Socrates, which conceals one truth while
expressing another.28 Neither is it the even more complex irony of Alexander Nehamas,
which conceals a question mark behind an ironic surface.29 It is, rather, what
Thrasymachus calls Socrates’ irony (Rep. I, 337a), which Vlastos30 translates
“shamming.” It is a tactic to lure interlocutors into stating their own position so that
Socrates may practice the elenchus on it, as Robinson claimed.31 It does not conceal a
truth within itself, as Vlastos’ complex irony does; it expresses a falsehood. According to
28

Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), Ch. 1 (21-44); cf. Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” in Vlastos, Socratic Studies, Myles
Burnyeat, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Ch. 2 (39-66). Vlastos discusses the irony
of the speech of Alcibiades extensively in his 1991, Ch. 1 (33-44). My interpretation disagrees with his
almost completely. I do, however, consider the possibility of a more complex irony in the interpretation of
Socrates’ arguments below.
29
Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1998, passim.
30
Vlastos (1991), 24-5.
31
Richard Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953) Ch. 2, esp. pp
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Alcibiades, Socrates is not “barren,” as the Midwife analogy of the Theaetetus indicates,
but pregnant with divine logoi; his professions to the contrary are simply insincere.32
The second question concerns the irony implicit in Socrates’ arguments. On the
surface, these logoi appear ridiculous; when one looks beneath the surface, however, they
turn out to be the only logoi that make sense. The deeper meaning of the arguments are
there for anyone to see, but perhaps only Alcibiades and a few others, like Apollodorus
and Aristodemus, are able to see them. Perhaps Alcibiades did not need a mystagogos in
any sense but that of a person who could state elenctic arguments, to see for himself the
constructive philosophical conclusions suggested by Socratic logoi. This irony seems to
be of a more complex sort than the irony involved in Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge.
One and the same argument, on this account, contains both a superficial, literal
interpretation and a deeper, non-literal one. Socrates’ arguments may meet Vlastos’
criterion for complex irony: they conceal one truth while revealing another.
The appeal to irony is a dangerous one for scholars. If a scholar claims that a
particular Socratic argument or proposition is ironic, he or she runs the risk of failing to
take seriously what Socrates is asserting. So it is with Alcibiades: he may be failing to
take the Socratic profession of ignorance seriously. Still, this is a claim that Alcibiades is
putting forward in his speech, not one that a scholar is making on his behalf. As such it
has to be dealt with, its meaning and implications examined. If Alcibiades is right,
Socrates’ profession of ignorance was a sham and the interpretation of Robinson (on this
point, anyway) is correct.

Note that, apart from the reference in Alcibiades’ speech to Socrates’ irony, Socrates’ account of his
treatment at the hands of Diotima, and his own disparagement of the quality of his wisdom at 175e, this
Socratic irony is largely absent from the Symposium. Socrates admits at the outset that he has knowledge of
ta erotika, and speaks consistently with that admission throughout.
32
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Alcibiades’ speech opens the door to a way of understanding the relation between
the “early,” “Socratic,” or “elenctic” dialogues and the “middle,” “Platonic,” or
“constructive” dialogues that is different from one common “developmentalist” picture.
On this interpretation it is not that Plato’s thought develops from a “Socratic” phase, in
which Plato offers us a Socrates who lacks answers to the philosophical questions he
raises and who therefore disavows philosophical wisdom, to a “Platonic” phase, in which
he offers his own answers to Socrates’ questions.33 Rather, Socrates presents two faces to
the world. His public face, which he presents to all but his most intimate disciples, is that
of the ignorant questioner. His private face, which he reveals only to those disciples, is
that of the constructive philosopher. We need not say that this Socrates is a theorist with
completely articulate answers to philosophical questions. We might prefer to say that he
is, by virtue of his intellectual vision of the Form of Beauty, a mystagogos, a guide to the
highest mysteries of philosophy.34 (If Diotima’s account of psychological pregnancy can
be invoked at this point, we might suggest that the reason Socrates revealed his inner
images of virtue to Alcibiades and not to some others is that Socrates, like anyone else,
could only procreate in the presence of beauty, whether that of the body or that of the
soul.)
Charles Kahn has argued that the arguments of the early dialogues are proleptic,
in that they lead to the solutions propounded in the middle dialogues.35 Perhaps Socrates’

33

Gregory Vlastos presented an influential version of this story in his (1991), 45-106. There are, of course,
many variants of this view.
34
David Sedley has suggested in The Midwife of Platonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 8-13, that
Socrates, though not a Platonist himself, was the midwife of Platonism. My suggestion is that he may have
been the mystagogos of Platonism. The person he would have led most famously to the metaphysical
vision at the heart of Platonism would, of course, be Plato himself.
35
Charles Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp.
Ch. 2 (36-70). I am myself uncertain whether Plato intended them to be read proleptically, but at least
several of them can be so read.
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arguments are proleptic in another sense, which is not, however, unrelated to Kahn’s:
perhaps they lead at least some interlocutors from the refutation of their cherished beliefs
to the discovery of philosophical truth. Perhaps, once the false beliefs that are the result
of cultural indoctrination are removed, the true beliefs that reflect the nature of reality
(and that, according to the doctrine of Recollection, are innate in the soul) emerge almost
spontaneously. Such arguments would not be merely negative, but implicitly
constructive. They, and the person who propounded them, would be clever and ironic, but
not merely so; the irony in question would be complex and deep, a simultaneous
concealment and expression of a constructive philosophical vision underlying the critical
elenctic examination. Perhaps, as the Meno suggests, the Socratic elenchus is merely the
first stage in the process of recollection.
Assessment of the Speech
How seriously are we to take Alcibiades’ portrait of Socrates? It is easy to reject
or dismiss his claims on the grounds that he is very drunk, as he admits (212e), and that
his drunken state reflects his intemperate character, which was notorious, and which
marks him as a failed project in Socratic philosophical education. The seduction story is
moreover told for comic effect, so why should we take seriously the rest of his speech?
My response is, first, that the rest of the speech does not seem comical, but rather
profound. The portrait of Socrates Alcibiades offers seems, on its merits, to be worthy of
serious consideration. Second, Alcibiades, though clearly a morally ambiguous character,
was regarded by the Athenian citizenry as the most able, most brilliant, and thus most
dangerous Athenian political leader in the generation following Pericles. It was not for
nothing that Socrates pursued and attempted to educate him. Third, this speech, even if it
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may be grounded in an historical event, must be seen as the composition, not of
Alcibiades, but of Plato. Plato has offered, in the speech of Diotima, an account of the life
of one who ascended to the Form of Beauty. He now follows that with a speech of
Alcibiades that describes Socrates as one who has made that ascent and who lives that
life. When Alcibiades describes the experience of looking inside Socrates and finding
there divine logoi and images of virtue that others do not see, I think he speaks for Plato
as well as for himself.
There is a fourth reason I think that Alcibiades’ portrait of Socrates should be
taken seriously. Socrates is portrayed in this dialogue as a charismatic philosophical
teacher, a man who could earn the devotion of the ablest minds in Athens, one of which
was certainly Alcibiades. I suggest that the idea of a Socrates who conceals the path to a
life of virtue behind his apparently negative arguments is a figure more able to explain
the attachment of an Alcibiades, or for that matter, of a Plato, than the barren, ignorant
elenctic inquirer. I doubt that either would have long been interested in the latter
character; but the person who offered glimpses of divine truth behind a veil of ignorance
would have been, for both of them, endlessly fascinating. Every day that a disciple
conversed with Socrates the possibility would exist that the veil would part, the Silenus
open, and the divine vision might be revealed, if only for a moment.
The concept of Socrates’ philosophical activity in Alcibiades’ speech corresponds
in part with the self-portrait Socrates offers in the Midwife passage of the Theaetetus. In
one respect, as I noted above, the two portraits are opposites: the Socrates of the Midwife
passage insists that he is barren, while Alcibiades describes Socrates as chock full of
virtue and divine images. What the two comparisons share, however, is the idea that at
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least some of Socrates’ companions “make progress” (Tht. 150d5), come to see, or at
least to glimpse, the truth. I should note also that Xenophon, who has a much humbler
view of the truths that Socrates conveyed to his disciples, shares the conviction that
Socrates led his interlocutors out of ignorance and into moral wisdom (cf. e.g. Mem. I.2,
IV.1). There is at most a hint of the Socratic profession of ignorance in Xenophon, but he
repeatedly shows Socrates using his method of elenctic argument to improve his
interlocutors morally.
For these reasons, therefore, I believe that it is plausible that the “fertile” Socrates
of Alcibiades’ portrait in the Symposium, filled with virtue and divine logoi, is in fact an
accurate portrait of the historical Socrates. I do not think that this can be demonstrated,
though. Plato offers us several portraits of Socrates, some of which are mutually
incompatible, and this is but one. I do think that it is an important, and relatively
neglected portrait of that Socrates, and I also think that its credentials are as good as any
of its rivals. It is, however, only one Platonic portrait of Socrates, and it needs to be
viewed in light of its rivals, including the portrait of Socrates as a midwife in the
Theaetetus. Alcibiades’ appeal to irony as a device for reconciling Socrates’ professed
ignorance with his hidden wisdom is an interpretation that deserves serious consideration
by scholars. I think, moreover, that this portrait tells us something important about the
way in which Plato perceived Socrates’ influence on him: that Socrates led him to the
discovery of the Forms. Socrates, as I have suggested above, was Plato’s mystagogos.
Harmonization
It remains to harmonize the different individual portraits of Socrates in the
Symposium into a single picture. This is, in some respects, relatively easy to do.
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Apollodorus and Aristodemus show us a Socrates who is capable of inspiring great
loyalty in his followers, as does Alcibiades. They show us a Socrates who experiences
extended trances, as does Alcibiades. Agathon’s remarks link these trances with a
reputation for wisdom that Socrates possesses, at least in his eyes. Socrates admits that he
has knowledge of erotics; he also rejects Agathon’s humorous suggestion that knowledge
can be transferred from one who has it to one who does not by a process of osmosis.
Diotima’s speech indicates what the acquisition of that knowledge involves: the guidance
of a mystagogos to the ultimate object of knowledge.
The difficult problem is to reconcile the portrait of Socrates in Diotima’s speech
with the portrait in Alcibiades’ speech. I suggested three strategies above for harmonizing
these two portraits: first, the strategy of treating Diotima, or her speech, as a rhetorical
creation of Socrates; second, the strategy (which is explicitly adopted by Alcibiades) of
treating Socrates’ genuine wisdom as cloaked behind an ironic mask of ignorance; and
third, the strategy of treating the speech of Diotima as representing an early, “preenlightenment” stage of Socrates’ thought. The Socrates who emerges from these
strategies is one who is in fact filled with divine images of virtue, images which he
generally conceals but which he may, on occasion reveal to his disciples. According to
Diotima, the effect of knowledge on the soul is the acquisition of virtue (212a-b);
according to Alcibiades, Socrates is a uniquely, divinely virtuous man. All in all, this
seems to me to be a generally coherent portrait. Diotima’s speech places Socrates in the
vicinity of the Form of Beauty without actually stating that he has direct, experiential
knowledge of it; Alcibiades’ speech affirms that Socrates has taken the final step in the
ascent. All in all, interpreted in this way, the Symposium offers a “progressive revelation”
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of Socrates’ wisdom, from the first hints in the opening pages, through Diotima’s portrait
to the final account of Alcibiades.
Conclusion
I think it was Plato’s intention in the Symposium to connect the historical Socrates
to his own metaphysical and epistemological theories, to show that Socrates was the
mystagogos who led him to those theories. He describes Socrates in terms his
contemporaries would recognize as historically accurate: the philosopher with devoted
disciples, practitioner of the elenchus, self-proclaimed expert in erotics. He has one of his
most controversial disciples describe him as supremely, uniquely, divinely virtuous. Then
he connects these traits with experiential knowledge of the Forms, or at least the Form of
Beauty. A great majority of scholars will reject this connection as ahistorical. I have tried
to make the case that it need not be taken as such. I do not think one can show that it must
not be so taken. The idea of a Socrates lacking in metaphysical and epistemological
doctrines may be too entrenched in contemporary Socratic scholarship to be dislodged. If
it is possible to see this Socrates not as the definitive historical Socrates, however, but as
just one of several Socrateses in Plato, it might be possible to consider the credentials of
the alternative presented in this dialogue.
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